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In the early hours of January 3 at about 1 a.m. local time, a reaper drone killed
Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani on the road leading to Baghdad
International Airport. Killed alongside Soleimani was Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes,
deputy commander of Iraq’s quasi-official Hashd al-Shaabi, or Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMFs) and leader of the Iraqi militia and PMF Keta’ib
Hezbollah.The U.S. Defense Department released a statement indicating that
“the U.S. military has taken decisive defensive action to protect U.S. personnel
abroad by killing Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps-Quds Force, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization […] This strike
was aimed at deterring future Iranian attack plans.”
In the morning of January 4, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo asserted that
intelligence reports indicated that Soleimani had been “actively plotting” to “take big
action … that would have put hundreds of lives at risk,” and that the United States
had acted to eliminate “imminent threats to American lives.”
Most of the comments draw the conclusion quite quickly that the attacks are clearly
contrary to international law. United Nations Special Rapporteur Agnes Callamard
described the targeted killings of Soleimani and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis in her tweet
as
“most lokely [sic!] unlawful and violate international human rights law”
On the basis of the facts known so far, it seems appropriate to make only a
preliminary assessment of the legal situation in a rather cautious manner.
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The attack could constitute a violation of the prohibition of  the use of force under
Art 2 (4) UN Charter. However, two justifications are conceivable here, self-defence
according to Art 51 UN Charter and intervention by invitation.
Intervention by invitation
Intervention by invitation is a topos under customary international law for the use
of force, practised by the Soviet Union in Hungary in 1956 and in Afghanistan in
1979. However, it was abused in these two cases. But also France intervened in
the Central African Republic in 1996 on this legal basis. However, an intervention
by invitation only creates a legal basis for the use of force if it took place before the
intervention and not under pressure from the intervening state.
The statement by the Iraqi Prime Minister Mahdi, that the attack was an obvious
violation of Iraqi sovereignty is in fact a clear argument against permission. However,
the situation is potentially the same as it was after US drone attacks in Pakistan.
The then Pakistani President Musharaf and his successor Zardari condemned
various drone attacks. But at the same time they received former President of the
USA George W. Bush immediately after drone attacks as a good ally in the fight
against terror during a state visit. The drone attacks were massively expanded by
President Obama. United States General Eric Holder justified the drone attacks
with the permission of the affected state. The reaction of President Mahdi is likely
to have been similarly politically motivated and probably took place in opposition to
permission. The declaration of the Iraqi parliament on 5 January to expel all foreign
troops from the country does not, moreover, speak against permission from Iraq.
After all, the former is not binding under international law. On the contrary, it merely
shows the enormous domestic political pressure under which the political system in
Iraq is currently under.
Anticipatory self-defence
The right to anticipatory self-defence is by no means as controversial under
international law as it has been occasionally read in this case. Only the limits of the
right to anticipatory self-defence are really controversial. A purely reactive right of
self-defence is rather represented by only a few voices. State practice also confirms
the relevance of the criteria of the so-called Webster formula,
“a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and
no moment of deliberation”,
for assessing use of force in the run-up to an armed attack. However, the Webster
formula in modern international law is perpetuated to “imminence”, even if the term
“imminence” is not at all found in the correspondence between the USA and the
United Kingdom following the Caroline incident in the 19th century. In this respect,
the first question to be asked is whether an attack was imminent. Whether General
Soleimani, as commander of the Quds Brigades, had concretely planned an attack,
or better again an attack that was imminent and would have reached the quality of
an armed attack, is not known to the public at present. Daniel Webster himself also
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pointed out in his correspondence, first with Henry Fox and later with Lord Asburton
(Alexander Baring), that the scope of the right of self-defence must be assessed
according to the situation:
“The extent of this right is a question to be judged of the circumstances of each
particular case”.
Therefore, it is crucial to know the exact circumstances of the events as far as
possible. However, this is currently not the case. Consequently it is not possible
yet to assess in any substantive way whether the Caroline criteria were met in the
armed attack of 3 January. Moreover, the “great law of self-defense” (Webster), as
Georg Schwarzenberger rightly stated, is the ultimate right that sovereign states
would be prepared to renounce. This, and the lack of information, is probably the
reason why none of the states allied with the USA condemned the attack as contrary
to international law. The Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Dominic Raab,
even affirmed the USA’s right of self-defence as early as 5 January:
“It was General Soleimani’s job description to engage proxies, militias across not
just Iraq but the whole region, not just to destabilize those countries but to attack
Western countries… In those circumstances the right of self-defence clearly applies.“
However, it is not known whether the British Foreign Office had concrete information
about an imminent attack.
To hastily deny the right of self-defence, after a few days and without knowing the
exact circumstances, is unlikely to be conducive to the acceptance of international
law. Neither does the threat to attack cultural sites, which is in principle contrary to
international law.
An earlier version of this article was published in FAZ Einspruch in German on 13
January 2020.
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